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COMMUNITY HEALTH CENTERS AND RISING
MALPRACTICE PREMIUMS: AN OVERVIEW
OF THE COMMUNITY HEALTH CENTER
PROGRAM AND PROPOSED SOLUTIONS TO
THE MALPRACTICE INSURANCE RATE CRISIS
INTRODUCTION
For over a quarter of a century, the community health center
program has provided primary care health services to low-
income and uninsured patients throughout the United States.'
Under the program, private non-profit health care centers carry
out a unique mission to bring cost-effective and affordable
health care to medically-underserved persons of remote rural
communities and impoverished inner-city neighborhoods.2 As
federal grant recipients, these health centers fulfill an expressed
federal purpose of treating communities and population groups
that the government has designated as specially needy.3
Recently, the viability of the community health center
program has been threatened by burdensome malpractice
insurance costs.' Centers initially were staffed by federally-
insured physicians of the National Health Service Corps
(NHSC).5 Budget cuts and policy changes in the NHSC, howev-
er, forced centers to hire former NHSC physicians as their own
employees and supplement the clinical staff with private sector
physicians. This change forced centers to purchase professional
malpractice insurance coverage, the cost of which has increased
dramatically for all health care providers in recent years.6
These increasing insurance costs are forcing centers to decrease
or eliminate services to the patients that centers are required to
treat under federal law.7
Community health center representatives, Congress, and the
Bush Administration agree that commercial malpractice premi-
1 See infra notes 3, 11 and accompanying text.
See discussion infra part I.A
q Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. § 254c (1988). See discussion infra
part I.A.
4 See discussion infra part III.
' NHSC physicians, as federal employees, enjoy liability protection under
the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2671-2680 (1988).
6 See infra note 55.
See discussion infra part III.D.
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um costs place the centers in a precarious position and that a
solution must be fashioned which will allow the centers to
continue their mission of care to the indigent.' Policy-makers
further agree that the federal government can no longer afford
to divert vast sums of public health funding into commercial
malpractice insurance.' Yet, they are divided over how to
address the problem.
This article examines the role of community health centers
and the mechanism by which the government-center partner-
ship fulfills its stated mission. It explores factors contributing
to escalating malpractice premium costs and the adverse conse-
quences of these costs on center services. Finally, it evaluates
three proposed solutions currently in the 102nd Congress. 10
I. A UNIQUE AND SUCCESSFUL MISSION
A. COMMUNITY HEALTH CENTER PROGRAM GOALS
AND SERVICES
The community health center program was created in the
mid-1960's to facilitate the Johnson Administration's "War on
Poverty."" From its inception, the program embodied notions
of comprehensive health care, unhindered access, and communi-
ty participation in the management of health care resources. 2
Its purpose is to provide financially accessible health care to
8 See Robert Pear, Community Health Clinics Cut Back as Malpractice
Insurance Costs Soar, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 21, 1991, at A18.
s Hearings on H.R. 2239, The Federally Assisted Health Clinics Legal
Protection Act of 1991 Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Law and Gov't Rel. of
the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 7-10, 35 (July 17,
1991) [hereinafter H.R. 2239 Hearings] (statements of Representative Ron
Wyden and Representative Jim McDermott).
"o The Federally Supported Health Centers Assistance Act of 1991, H.R.
3591, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); Ensuring Access Through Medical Liability
Reform Act of 1991, S. 489, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); Community and
Migrant Health Centers Self-Insurance Act of 1991, S. 815, 102d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1991).
'" The community health center program was initially funded by a 1966
amendment to the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 89-794, 80
Stat. 1451 (1966). Since 1975, the centers have received federal funding under
tit. III, § 330 of the Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. § 254c (1988).
12 ALICE SARDELL, THE U.S. EXPERIMENT IN SOCIAL MEDICINE: THE
COMMUNITY HEALTH CENTER PROGRAM, 1965-1986 3 (1988). For a comprehen-
sive history of the community health center program, see id. at 3-233.
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catchment areas identified by the U.S. Department of Health
and Human Services (DHHS) as severely medically under-
served. Specifically, centers target remote rural communities
and economically depressed inner-city neighborhoods exhibiting
elevated poverty rates, significantly above-average infant mor-
tality rates, high concentrations of poor, elderly and minority
residents, and low concentrations of physicians. 3 Today, 600
community health centers serve approximately six million
patients each year at 1500 clinic sites located throughout the
country.
14
Title III § 330 of the Public Health Service Act requires each
community health center to provide certain core services includ-
ing primary health services, 5 health information, 6 ongoing
case management, 7 and transportation services.' The Act
further requires centers to offer, as appropriate, various supple-
mental health services such as rehabilitation, counseling,
extended care, and ambulatory surgery or provide referrals to
such services. 9 Federal guidelines also ensure that the cen-
13 NATIONAL AsS'N OF COMMUNITY HEALTH CTRS. INC., AcCESS TO COMMU-
NITY HEALTH CARE: A DATA BOOK 10 (1991) [hereinafter DATA BOOK]. A
complementary federal initiative, the migrant health center program, address-
es the health needs of migrant farm workers through rural-based and mobile
health clinics. Migrant health centers are funded under tit. III, § 329 of the
Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. § 247d. While the program is smaller in
scope than the community health center program, federal funding require-
ments are similar to those of community health centers. The malpractice
insurance crisis discussed in this article has impacted migrant health centers
with identical force.
14 Pear, supra note 8, at A18.
15 Primary health care services include diagnostic lab and x-ray services,
emergency medicine, preventive dental services, pharmacy services and
preventive care services such as childhood vision and hearing examinations,
perinatal and family planning services. 42 U.S.C. 254c(b).
16 42 U.S.C. § 254c(a)(5).
'7 42 U.S.C. § 254c(a)(6).
18 42 U.S.C. § 254c(b)(1)(E).
19 42 U.S.C. § 254c(a)(2)-(3), (b)(2). Centers engage in formal and informal
arrangements with local health departments, other health clinics and hospitals
to provide specialty care. Such services include mental health and substance
abuse treatment, restorative dental care, and ambulatory surgery. See
NATIONAL ASS'N OF COMMUNITY HEALTH CTRS. INC., COMMUNITY AND MI-
GRANT HEALTH CENTERS, A KEY COMPONENT OF THE U.S. HEALTH CARE
SYSTEM: OVERVIEW AND STATUS REPORT 1991, 18-19 (1991) [hereinafter
OVERVIEW AND STATUS REPORT].
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ters tailor their services to the clinical, social and cultural needs
of the immediate communities they serve.2"
Community health centers address the varied health needs
of a wide-ranging population. Nearly ten percent of all clinic
patients seek care for serious disabilities, including AIDS,
severe physical and medical illness and conditions, and alcohol
or substance abuse problems.2 Forty-four percent of all pa-
tients are children under age eighteen.22 A crucial role of the
centers is to provide obstetrical and maternity care. With the
recent exodus of private obstetricians and family doctors from
obstetrical practice, community health centers have inherited
the burden of providing obstetrical care to many low income
women who have no other source of care.' Centers provide
prenatal care to approximately 12% of all high risk low income
women in this country and approximately 30% of all U.S.
women under age fifteen who give birth.24
Federal provisions require centers to dispense care on an
ability-to-pay, sliding fee scale basis." Patients whose family
income falls below twice the federally-defined poverty level
' DHHS requires centers to perform ongoing needs assessments of their
service areas and target populations and to engage in community-based
program planning. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., PROGRAM
EXPECTATIONS FOR COMMUNITY AND MIGRANT HEALTH CENTERS 3 (1991)
[hereinafter PROGRAM EXPECTATIONS]. Such planning efforts have led
individual centers to develop special intervention programs for significant
community health concerns such as teen pregnancy, substance abuse, infant
mortality and AIDS. OVERVIEW AND STATUS REPORT supra note 19, at 3, 18.
Furthermore, federal guidelines require that a majority of the board of
directors of each center represent a cross-section of center patients. 42 U.S.C.
§ 254c(e)(3)(G). This ensures that clinics receive input from the immediate
community about current and emerging health needs.
21 DATA BOOK, supra note 13, at 11.
' DATA BOOK, supra note 13, at United States-4.
' Dana Hughes et al., Obstetrical Care for Low-Income Women: The
Effects of Medical Malpractice on Community Health Centers, 2 MED. PROF.
LIABILITY AND THE DELIVERY OF OBSTETRICAL CARE 59 (1989) (reporting that
as many as 14% of private obstetricians have decreased the number of
deliveries they perform and 23% have decreased the percentage of their
practice time devoted to high-risk obstetrics).
'4 Federal Tort Claims Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Law
and Gov't Rel. of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 34
(Sept. 25, 1990) [hereinafter FTCA Hearings] (statement of Daniel R.
Hawkins, Jr., Director of Policy Analysis, National Association of Community
Health Centers, Inc. (NACHC)).
' 42 C.F.R. § 51c.303(f) (1991).
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receive free care. This category represents a majority of clinic
patients." Forty-nine percent of health center patients are
completely uninsured and 39% receive public insurance, primar-
ily Medicaid. Only 12% of clinic patients carry some level of
private insurance.
Community health centers employ over 3000 board certified
or board eligible physicians and numerous other health profes-
sionals. Center staff sizes vary widely depending on the size
and characteristics of the target populations and available
resources.' An average clinic employs about 50 persons,2 9
but the sizes and types of staff vary widely depending on the
size and characteristics of the target populations and available
resources. 0 In addition to physicians, nurses, and clinical
assistants, centers also typically employ social workers, health
educators and outreach workers.3 ' Centers may also contract
with outside health personnel.32
Until the early 1980's, the centers' physician component was
supplied predominantly by physicians of NHSC.33 Under a
Reagan Administration directive to reduce the cost of the NHSC
field placement program, most NHSC physicians were assigned
to the community health centers as ceriter employees, rather
' Over 60% of all health center users have family incomes below the
federal poverty level. NATIONAL AsS'N OF COMMUNITY HEALTH CTRS. INC.,
COMMUNITY AND MIGRANT HEALTH CENTERS: TWO DECADES OF ACHIEVEMENT
3 (Sara Rosenbaum ed. 1987) [hereinafter Two DECADES OF ACHIEVEMENT].
' A comparison to the health insurance profile in the general United
States patient population (65% privately insured; 24% publicly insured; 11%
uninsured) starkly demonstrates the insurance coverage deficiencies of the
centers' patients. DATA BOOK, supra note 13, at United States-2.
21 OVERvIEw AND STATUs REPORT, supra note 19, at 20.
' FTCA Hearings, supra note 24, at 38.
.0 OVERVIEW AND STATus REPORT, supra note 19, at 20. A center's clinical
team includes, on average, 5.87 full time equivalent (FTE) physicians (mostly
family practitioners and general internists, with a smaller proportion of
obstetricians and pediatricians), 2.21 FTE mid-level practitioners (nurse
practitioners, nurse midwives and physician assistants) and 1.07 FTE dentists.
Id.
3 Id. at 20.
32 42 U.S.C. § 254c(a).
33 OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVS., MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND THE COMMUNITY HEALTH CENTERS 1
(1991) [hereinafter DHHS INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT].
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than employees of the federal government.34 This change in
employment status forced centers to assume responsibility for
providing professional malpractice insurance coverage since the
physicians could no longer enjoy liability protection under the
Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA).3 ' As this article later ad-
dresses, the burden of purchasing commercial malpractice
insurance has placed the centers in a precarious financial
position, threatening the future of the program's mission.
B. PROGRAM SUCCESSES
Despite financial challenges, the community health center
program, over its history, has achieved a positive impact on the
health of the populations it serves. 36 For example, communi-
ties served by the centers exhibit infant mortality rates nearly
ten percent lower than communities not served by such cen-
ters.3" Center patients have over 50% higher immunization
rates and considerably more prenatal care than community
residents who do not use center services.38
The program also succeeds at providing cost-effective care.
For example, community health centers' laboratory, medical,
radiology and pharmacy costs are about two-thirds the national
average for all health care providers. 39 Moreover, by empha-
sizing preventive care, the program limits overall health care
expenditures. Since illnesses are diagnosed and treated at
earlier stages, fewer expensive interventions (such as emergency
care, inpatient or specialty care) are required. Community
health center patients experience fewer hospital admissions,
shorter inpatient stays, and fewer inappropriate uses of emer-
gency rooms than persons living in comparable communities
without such centers.4"
' Id. A small percentage of center physicians (about 10%) are still
employed, paid and insured by the federal government because of special
circumstances. H.R. 2239 Hearings, supra note 9, at 8 (statement of Repre-
sentative Ron Wyden).
31 DHHS INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT, supra note 33, at 1. The Federal
Tort Claims Act is codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2671-2680 (1988).
6 See generally Two DECADES OF ACHIEVEMENT, supra note 26.
3' DATA BOOK, supra note 13, at 15.
8 OVERVIEW AND STATUS REPORT, supra note 19, at 3.
39 Two DECADES OF ACHIEVEMENT, supra note 26, at 8.
40 DATA BOOK, supra note 13, at 15. The cost effectiveness of the communi-
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Despite the success of the program, current federal funding
levels prohibit centers from addressing the health needs of all
low-income persons in the center's communities. Indeed, 15 to
28% of center patient loads are placed on waiting lists because
of limitations on financial and professional resources.4 This
access problem testifies, in part, to the need for expanded center
resources and, one can argue, a greater number of centers in
general.
II. A PARTNERSHIP WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERN-
MENT
Congress established the community health center program
with the intent of using taxpayer funds to provide health servic-
es to underserved persons.4" From the outset of the program,
the federal government elected to develop a contractual relation-
ship with the private sector for coordination of services, yet
provided the majority of physicians through the NHSC. Now
that the majority of center physicians are no longer federal
employees,4" the situation today represents an even purer
federal-private partnership in which the federal partner pre-
dominately provides financing and general supervision.
The flow of grants from the federal government to the non-
profit community centers is the lifeblood of this partnership."
Through the grant procedure of the Public Health Service Act,
the DHHS Secretary, using congressionally appropriated funds,
provides seed money for clinic development and annual opera-
ty health center program has prompted center advocates to argue that federal
policy makers should view the clinic system as a model for any future coordi-
nated national health care reform proposals. Telephone Interview with Daniel
R. Hawkins, Jr., Policy Director, NACHC (Oct. 11, 1991). See generally FTCA
Hearings, supra note 24, at 3 (statement of Daniel R. Hawkins, Jr. Policy
Director, NACHC).
41 137 CONG. REC. S4364 (daily ed. April 11, 1991) (statement of Senator
Hank Brown).
42 H.R. 2239 Hearings, supra note 9, at 35 (statement of Representative
Jim McDermott).
43 See supra text accompanying note 34.
" Centers apply to the federal government for categorical grants every
three years and follow-up with annual amendments. Centers' funding needs
are calculated, in part, by projecting the number of physicians required to care
for the target population. Telephone Interview with Dave Cavenaugh, Policy
Research Specialist, NACHC (Feb. 18, 1992).
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tional grants to support ongoing operations.41 While the stat-
ute provides that the Secretary may issue grants to cover only
the excess of costs over net receipts,46 this amount, in fact,
represents 44% of total clinic funding.4  Medicaid reimburse-
ment accounts for approximately 30% of clinic revenues. 4 The
remaining 26% of funds is derived from state and local grants,
private insurance, and a small number of self-paying pat-
ients.49 By serving a largely poor patient population, 49% of
which is completely uninsured, 39% of which is insured by
Medicaid, and another 12% of which has minimal private
insurance, the centers experience monumental bad debts and
contractual allowance shortfalls."0 Federal grant money inevi-
tably makes up the deficit and, thus, is indispensable to the
continuing viability of community health centers.
Federal funding is conditioned upon compliance by the grant
recipients with certain federal grant management rules.5 In
addition to clinical, service area, and fiscal requirements, com-
munity health centers are expected to meet quality assurance,
staffing and productivity standards.52 These federal guidelines
are an important mechanism to assure that the goals of the
program are met.
4 42 U.S.C. § 254c(c)-(d). The funds are administered by two offices within
the DHHS: the Bureau of Health Care and Assistance of the Public Health
Service. OvERVIEW AND STATUS REPORT, supra note 19, at 1.
4 An annual operational grant to a center, "may not exceed the amount by
which the costs of operation ... exceed the total of-
(i) State, local and other operational funding, and
(ii) the fees, premiums, and third-party reimbursements, which the center
may reasonably be expected to receive for its operations in such fiscal year."
42 U.S.C. 254c(d)(4)(A).
4 H.R. 2239 Hearings, supra note 9, at 8 (statement of Representative Ron
Wyden).
4' Telephone Interview with Dave Cavenaugh, Policy Research Specialist,
NACHC (Feb. 18, 1992).
49 Id.
o Contractual allowances represent the difference between billed charges
and contracted reimbursement rates.
42 U.S.C. § 254c(c)-(e); 42 C.F.R. § 51c.303 (1991).
52 For example, centers are expected to define clinical experience and
competence standards for staff privileges, ensure access to continuing profes-
sional education, maintain written policies regarding clinical protocols and
risk management, and monitor clinical quality through ongoing quality
assurance programs. PROGRAM EXPECTATIONS, supra note 20, at 22 (expanding
upon federal grant management rules).
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In recent years, annual appropriations for the community
health center program have totaled about $478 million.53 In
addition, President Bush's 1993 budget proposes an additional
$90 million to expand the scope of the community health center
program.' Despite continued federal support, however, the
survival of the program's mission has been jeopardized by high
and escalating professional malpractice insurance costs.
III. THE MALPRACTICE INSURANCE RATE CRISIS
AND ITS CONSEQUENCES
The rising cost of malpractice insurance threatens the
continuing viability of all health care providers today.55 While
there is no indication that insurance premiums for community
health centers and their doctors have risen considerably faster
than for other medical personnel providing similar services,"
the rate increases imposed on centers are sizeable and appear
disproportionately large in relation to the centers' actual claims
experience.
A. COMMUNITY HEALTH CENTER INSURANCE
Community health centers typically purchase a series of
insurance policies, including general liability coverage, 57 pro-
fessional malpractice, and corporate malpractice coverage.
Professional malpractice insurance provides coverage for a
center's physicians and other professional clinical staff. Corpo-
3 In fiscal years 1991 and 1992 Congress appropriated $478 million to the
centers. H.R. 2239 Hearings, supra note 9, at 35 (statement of Representative
Jim McDermott).
' Secretary Louis H. Sullivan, Remarks at DHHS Budget Briefing (Jan.
29, 1992) (transcript available through Federal News Service).
' The cost of professional liability insurance was the fastest growing
component of physician costs in the 1980's and this trend has continued in the
1990's. Between 1983 and 1988, professional liability insurance rose by
approximately 174%. 137 CONG. REC. S14907, S14915 (daily ed. Oct. 17, 1991)
(statement of Senator John C. Danforth).
' Premiums for obstetricians nationwide, for example, rose by as much as
300% between 1982 and 1987. DHHS INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT, supra
note 33, at 1.
' General liability insurance protects against many types of non-malprac-
tice suits and, among other things, indemnifies directors and officers of an
entity who can be sued in their capacity as fiduciaries of the centers.
19921
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rate malpractice insurance, providing "deep pocket" coverage,
protects the institutional entity against claims arising out of the
malpractice of its personnel. Approximately 85% of total mal-
practice premium dollars expended by the centers go to pur-
chase professional malpractice coverage while the remainder
buy corporate malpractice coverage.5 8 Centers are experienc-
ing the greatest cost increases for professional and corporate
malpractice coverage relative to other types of coverage.
Community health centers, in total, purchased $58 million in
professional and corporate malpractice insurance premiums in
1990,"9 representing more than 12% of the annual $478 million
federal appropriation to the community health center pro-
gram60 and, on the average, over 4% of each center's total
revenues. 61 Insurance costs for many individual centers have
increased more than fourfold in the last decade. 62 Some cen-
ters have seen their insurance costs triple in the last three
years alone.
B. DISCREPANCY BETWEEN PREMIUM RATES AND ACTUAL
CLAIMS EXPERIENCE
While aggregate data on successful malpractice claims
brought against the centers and their doctors are not currently
collected through standardized reporting,' various regional
surveys and studies, when aggregated, suggest that the actual
number of successful claims are small in comparison to premi-
ums paid. Successful malpractice claims brought against
centers (including litigation costs) total about $4 to $6 million
annually.' At one-twelfth (8%) of premiums paid, the actual
' Telephone Interview with Dave Cavenaugh, Policy Research Specialist,
NACHC (Mar. 19, 1992).
6 Pear, supra note 8, at A18.
8 See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
61 DHHS INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT, supra note 33, at 1.
62 Pear, supra note 8, at A18.
6 H.R. 2239 Hearings, supra note 9, at 35 (statement of Representative
Jim McDermott).
' To date, the Public Health Service has not routinely collected data from
centers on the number and dollar value of medical malpractice claims against
them. The Service will begin doing so in 1992. DHHS INSPECTOR GENERAL
REPORT, supra note 33, at 2.
' The NACHC contends that this $4 to $6 million figure is an accurate
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claims experience of clinics appears low to moderate as com-
pared to the insurance costs. 66  The $52 to $54 million differ-
ence between premiums and successful claims represents
federal dollars that could be utilized for direct patient care but
are instead channeled to commercial insurance companies.
The 8% claims-to-premiums ratio of community health
centers is considerably lower than that of other health care
providers. The ratio for private practice physicians, for exam-
ple, is approximately 65%.67 Thus, community health centers
believe that they are shouldering unwarranted insurance costs.
That insurers demand high premiums in the face of low payouts
seems to represent a failure of the market to respond realistical-
ly to the actual insurance risk represented by community health
centers.
C. INSURANCE INDUSTRY RATIONALES FOR HIGH
PREMIUM RATES
One may speculate that premium rates are set to contribute
to excessive underwriting profits.68 Indeed, the National Asso-
ciation of Community Health Centers (NACHC), the centers'
portrayal of claims experience. The U.S. Department of Justice argues that
current methodologies for collecting such data are unreliable. H.R. 2239
Hearings, supra note 9, at 18 (statement of Stuart M. Gerson, Assistant
Attorney General, Civil Division, U.S. Dep't of Justice). A report of DHHS
Inspector General, looking at all available data, estimates that malpractice
claims represent roughly 10% of the cost of premiums. This would equal $5.8
million for 1990. DHHS INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT, supra note 33, at 3.
' Center-specific examples are illustrative: the Peekskill Area Health
Center in New York State reports its malpractice insurance premiums rose
from $168,000 to $218,000 while the clinic has not paid any malpractice claims
in 15 years. Pear, supra note 8. Malpractice rates for five community health
centers in Providence, Rhode Island rose 39% last year even though the clinics
have not paid out any malpractice claims in 24 years. Id. Centers in Virginia
have spent over $900,000 in premiums during the last six years while paying
out only $1,800 in claims, a ratio of two-tenths of one percent. H.R. 2239
Hearings, supra note 9, at 42 (statement of Daniel R. Hawkins, Jr., Director
of Policy Analysis, NACHC).
6 H.R. 2239 Hearings, supra note 9, at 35 (statement of Representative
Jim McDermott).
' Only a relatively small number of insurers provide professional and
corporate malpractice coverage to the centers. This market condition might
enable these insurers to exact higher rates than would be expected in a
market with a greater number of suppliers.
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national advocacy group,69 has suggested that the excess cost
represents an insurance industry profit margin that goes beyond
even the most liberal reserves requirement and, arguably, is far
in excess of that necessary for good business practice.7" Premi-
um rates may also be set high in order to compensate for invest-
ment losses."' Finally, the disproportionately high premium
costs borne by centers may help to subsidize higher risk insur-
eds in the risk pool. Thus, community health centers may be
subsidizing other insureds who are paying fewer premium
dollars than their actual claims experience dictates they
should. 2
However, the insurance industry reports rate-making ratio-
nales which invoke notions of prudent risk protection and
structural practicality. Insurers cite adverse selection as a
fundamental rationale for their rate-making scheme. They
argue that the patients served by the centers, particularly the
poor and, especially, indigent pregnant women, represent high
insurance risks.74 Thus insurers maintain that it is necessary
to build sufficient reserves in anticipation of large payouts that
may occur in the future.7
' The mission of the NACHC is: "(1) to represent the interests of commu-
nity and migrant health centers and homeless health care programs and (2) to
serve as an information source concerning issues of health care for poor and
medically underserved populations in the U.S." OVERVIEW AND STATUS
REPORT, supra note 19, at back cover.
70 The NACHC Director of Policy Analysis has testified that the profit
margin afforded insurers is "far in excess of that necessary for good business
practice, at the expense of prenatal care and other vital services for the poor
and underserved in our communities." H.R. 2239 Hearings, supra note 9, at
39 (statement of Daniel R. Hawkins, Jr., Director of Policy Analysis, NACHC).
71 This practice is known as cash-flow underwriting.
This kind of cross-subsidization occurs when disparate risks are inappro-
priately pooled together.
" See Pear, supra note 8.
74 
Id.
"5 It is a common practice for insurance companies to build reserves in
anticipation of large payouts that arise from high risk endeavors. There is a
perception among underwriters that non-profit enterprises, in general, are
engaged in exceptionally risky activities. Michael Pierce Singsen, Comment,
Charity Is No Defense: The Impact of the Insurance Crisis on Nonprofit
Organizations and an Examination of Alternative Insurance Mechanisms, 22
U.S.F. L. REV. 599, 608 (1988) (the "inability to predict loss, compounded by
the random quality of claims made against nonprofits, may be the primary
reason why nonprofits have been disproportionately affected by the insurance
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Yet, the actual malpractice risks posed by community health
centers and the clientele they serve may be less than expected.
As a preliminary matter, indigent patients are much less able
and, thus, less likely, to file malpractice suits than are persons
of middle or upper incomes." Data suggest, for example, that
poor women are less likely to pursue a malpractice incident
than are more affluent women." Moreover, the risk-manage-
ment and quality assurance guidelines which accompany federal
grants78 ensure standards of quality care and thus are des-
igned to mitigate malpractice risk. In addition, the community
participation element of the community health center program
may promote more positive patient-doctor relationships and
thus result in fewer malpractice claims. 79  Finally, the argu-
ment that community health center patients possess higher
health risks and are, therefore, at a risk of poor outcomes,
seems irrelevant to the question of whether doctors treating
such patients will fall below a malpractice standard of care in
treating such patients.
crisis.").
76 See Edmund G. Doherty & Carl 0. Haven, Medical Malpractice and
Negligence: Sociodemographic Characteristics of Claimants and
Nonclaimants, 238 JAMA 1656, 1658 (1977) ("[Platients who are more
experienced with the health care provision system or who are of higher socio-
economic status are more apt to recognize negative medical experiences and,
therefore, make a claim or bring a suit."); see also DHHS INSPECTOR GENERAL
REPORT, supra note 33, at C-1 (T]he socio-economic and educational levels of
patients served by community health centers ... may constitute barriers to
awareness that the care provided or the outcome achieved does not meet
acceptable medical standards. Reduced access to alternative sources of care
may also mitigate against aggressive redress of injury." (quoting HEALTH
RESOURCES AND SERVS. ADMIN., CLAIMS OF MEDICAL INJURY, FILED UNDER THE
FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT AGAINST THE INDIAN HEALTH SERVICE AND THE
NATIONAL HEALTH SERVICE CORPS, BETWEEN FY 1980 AND FY 1986 (1987));
Molly McNulty, Are Poor Patients Likely to Sue for Malpractice?, 262 JAMA
1391 (1989) ("[C]urrent studies now universally demonstrate [that]...they [poor
people] are less likely to sue than are middle-class or privately insured
patients.").
7 7Hughes, supra note 23, at 61.
78 42 U.S.C. § 254c(c)-(e); 42 C.F.R. § 51c.303. See supra notes 51, 52 and
accompanying text.
7' "'The sense of community ownership,' one study noted, 'has made suits
less likely."' DHHS INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT, supra note 33 at C-1 n.7,
quoting ROBERT S. BURKE, CONNECTICUT PRIMARY CARE ASS'N, THE MALPRAC-
TICE INSURANCE QUESTION FOR THE COMMUNITY HEALTH CENTERS OF CON-
NECTICUT 20 (1991).
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Insurers further contend that implementing an insurance
scheme based upon actual claims experience 0 would be im-
practicable. They assert that they do not possess the requisite
detailed and comprehensive actuarial data that would be needed
to construct proper experience-based rates."' Certainly, suc-
cessful experience rating for the centers would require a com-
prehensive and time-tested data base of claims experience.8 2
However, the composite of surveys on community health center
claims," while undoubtedly falling short of the exacting actu-
arial requirements of the insurance industry, would seem, at
least, to suggest some rate-making guideposts to the insurers.
Whether the reasons advanced by insurers for high premi-
ums are valid, the fact remains that community health centers
are losing precious funds to costly commercial insurance premi-
ums.
D. COMPROMISES IN PROGRAM SERVICES
The impact of increasingly high malpractice insurance
premiums greatly compromises the integrity of the community
health center mission. Indeed, community health centers could
serve at least one-half million additional patients annually if
the money spent on malpractice insurance were instead directed
toward patient care.'
Other compromises in patient services resulting from high
insurance costs are common. Since centers are unable to pass
expenditure increases on to their patients, they are forced to
reduce services or eliminate some programs. Some centers have
had to discontinue obstetrical services entirely. 5 A 1991 sur-
vey conducted by the Department of Health and Human Servic-
es Office of the Inspector General found that 56% of centers
' Experience rating uses the loss experience of the insured during one
period to help set the premiums charged in the following period. See generally
KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK: INSURANCE, LEGAL THEORY, AND
PUBLIC POLICY 64-100 (1986).
81 Pear, supra note 8, at A18.
82 DHHS INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT, supra note 33, at 6.
' See supra text accompanying note 64.
' H.R. 2239 Hearings, supra note 9, at 40 (statement of Daniel Hawkins,
Jr., Director of Policy Analysis, NACHC).
' Pear, supra note 8, at A18.
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have had to significantly limit their pregnancy care due to
increased malpractice premiums."
In addition to its effect on services, the high .cost of insur-
ance has also hurt the centers' ability to recruit and hire per-
sonnel, especially family practice physicians and obste-
tricians."' Some centers have been forced to reduce their
staffs, thus frustrating patient access to timely services." One
study shows that some centers have been forced to replace
experienced doctors with new graduates since, under the insur-
ance industry rationale of accumulated exposure, more experi-
enced physicians must carry more expensive insurance. 9
In light of the community health centers' low claims experi-
ence and the insurance industry's unwillingness to charge
accordingly, commercial insurance does not appear to be a cost
effective way of insuring against malpractice losses for the
program.
IV. IDENTIFYING POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
The malpractice insurance cost crisis has prompted a search
for solutions, both legislative and non-legislative.
A. AN ATTEMPT AT SELF-INSURANCE
Before seeking legislative solutions, the community health
centers, through the NACHC, first pursued a self-help strategy
by exploring the feasibility of forming a self-insuring or risk
retention group.9" However, federal requirements rendered the
s DHHS INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT, supra note 33, at 2.
87 Hughes, supra note 23, at 68.
H.R. 2239 Hearings, supra note 9, at 40 (statement of Daniel R.
Hawkins, Jr., Policy Director of Policy Analysis, NACHC).
Hughes, supra note 23, at 70.
o There are two types of self-insurance arrangements. In a "captive"
arrangement, an entity or association of entities forms and owns its own
insurance company. Like a commercial insurer, the self-insuring group
collects premiums and maintains a capital fund, but it provides insurance only
to its owner group. Under a generic self-insurance arrangement, an entity or
association of entities insures itself without forming a separate insurance
company. The self-insuring entity expects to cover losses up to a specified
pooled amount (first-level coverage) and purchases reinsurance (second-level
coverage) from a commercial carrier to cover losses beyond that amount. The
NACHC explored this latter form of self-insurance. For a fuller explanation
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endeavor impossible since grant management rules prohibit use
of grant monies as capitalization for reserves. 9' Thus, the
centers could not contribute federal money or funds from a non-
federal source as capital to create an initial pool of reserves. 92
Furthermore, the community health centers discovered that no
commercial carriers were willing to provide the necessary
reinsurance (second-level insurance)93 for the self-insuring
group.94 Even if a private carrier were willing, the costs of
reinsurance would have been prohibitive to the centers.95
B. ANOTHER NON-LEGISLATIVE SOLUTION?
Perhaps another non-legislative solution lies in obtaining
relief through state insurance commissioners or in the courts.
Centers could argue that their malpractice rates are excessive,
unfairly discriminatory, and not in accord with sound actuarial
principles. Insurance regulation statutes and case law suggest
that insureds may challenge insurers charging excessive premi-
ums by showing that premiums are based upon dubious and
unsupported evidence in light of data demonstrating that claims
of self-insurance arrangements and their application in the context of midwife-
ry malpractice, see Gail A. Robinson, Midwifery and Malpractice Insurance:
A Profession Fights for Survival, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1001, 1027-34 (1986).
91 FTCA Hearings, supra note 24, at 35 (statement of Daniel R. Hawkins,
Jr., Director of Policy Analysis, NACHC). See also 42 C.F.R. §§ 51c.201-204,
51c.301-305 (1991).
2 Federal grant management rules apply to the entire budget of federal
grant recipients. Thus, while the federal government funds only 44% of a
center's budget, it has supervision over the entire budget. Federal grant
restrictions, therefore, apply to the use of all funds in a center's budget. As a
result, the centers were not allowed to contribute non-federal dollars for
capitalization of reserves. FTCA Hearings, supra note 24, at 35 (statement of
Daniel R. Hawkins, Jr., Director of Policy Analysis, NACHC).
' Insurance companies or self-insurers purchase reinsurance as additional
protection. Reinsurance typically provides protection against the risk that
primary insurance will be exhausted in paying catastrophic claims or an
excessive number of claims.
4 FTCA Hearings, supra note 24, at 35-36 (statement of Daniel R.
Hawkins, Jr., Director of Policy Analysis, NACHC).
' The NACHC estimates that every $10 million of primary insurance
requires approximately $6 million of reinsurance. Telephone Interview with
Daniel R. Hawkins, Jr., Director of Policy Analysis, NACHC (Feb. 18, 1992).
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experience warrants lower rates. An example of such a chal-
lenge is the Illinois case of Anzinger v. O'Connor98 .
In Anzinger, emergency room physicians argued that a
rating scheme employed by defendant insurer, a physician-
owned company, improperly placed them in a higher risk classi-
fication (and higher premium rate) than was warranted. The
plaintiffs demonstrated that their specialty's actuarial risk level
did not compare to that of general surgical specialties. Upon
this showing, they contended that the rates charged violated a
provision of the Illinois Insurance Code prohibiting "excessive"
or "unfairly discriminatory" insurance rates. The Illinois Direc-
tor of Insurance, following a hearing, found that the classifica-
tion system was not unfairly discriminatory toward emergency
room physicians and that the rates charged were not excessive.
The Anzinger court reversed the Director's decision on the
ground that the decision was contrary to the manifest weight of
the evidence regarding the relative riskiness of the emergency
room specialty.1
7
In reaching its decision, the court first noted that the Illinois
code provision provided that a premium rate will not be deemed
to be excessive unless "the rate is both 'unreasonably high for
the insurance provided' and 'a reasonable degree of competition
does not exist in the area with respect to the classification to
which such rate is applicable."'98 The court then found that
the insurer's data did not reliably lend itself to the classification
used.99 In light of the evidence that the insurance rate was so
disproportionately large, the court deemed the Director's deci-
sion as contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence regard-
' Anzinger v. O'Connor, 440 N.E.2d 1014 (Ill. 1982). See also Morgan v.
Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Kentucky, 794 S.W.2d 629 (Ky. 1989) (Kentucky
Commissioner of Insurance may refuse to approve a rate if "the benefits
provided are not reasonable in relation to the premiums charged and loss
ratios"); Medical Malpractice Joint Underwriting Ass'n of Massachusetts v.
Comm'r of Ins., 478 N.E.2d 936 (Mass. 1985) (challenge of medical malpractice
rates under Massachusetts insurance statute as not "adequate, just [and]
reasonable," not "actuarially sound," and "unsupported by substantial evidence
in the record"); Community Mut. Ins. Co. v. Fabe, 556 N.E.2d 1155 (Ohio
1990) (challenging Medicare complementary rate increase as "not calculated
according to sound actuarial principles.").
7Anzinger, 440 N.E.2d at 1021.
' Id. at 1020.
9Id. at 1021.
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ing the relative riskiness of the emergency medicine special-
ty.' ° Under the Anzinger holding and rationales, the commu-
nity health centers could argue that their actual claims experi-
ence suggests they are inappropriately classified with providers
who pose greater liability risks and, thus, centers bear
disproportionately large premiums.
While the holding of Anzinger suggests some hope for a
parallel community health center claim, bringing such a suit
would prove difficult for the centers. Assuming the centers
would want to fashion a program-wide solution, they would
have to bring a claim based on each of the states' statutory
prohibitions against unfairly discriminatory classification
schemes and excessive rate-making (such as those provisions of
the Illinois statute in Anzinger).1' Centers would then have
to present their arguments to the various state insurance
commissioners. However, commissioners are known to take a
wide variety of regulatory stances." 2 Some defer to market
forces to define boundaries for private insurance activities.
Others assume an eager regulatory posture. An inconsistency
of commissioner findings would likely result. Such inconsisten-
cy would not be cured by court actions brought against adverse
commissioner decisions, especially since courts give great defer-
ence to insurance commissioners' decisions."10 An inconsisten-
cy of litigation results would be an undesirable solution for the
community health center program as a whole.
Thus, the great variability in insurance regulation across the
states presents a practical difficulty to any effort of coordinating
a uniform solution.
V. LEGISLATIVE SOLUTIONS
Both Congress and the Bush Administration, acknowledging
a concern for the survival of the community health center
10 Id.
101 All states have statutes designed to prohibit excessive or unfairly
discriminatory insurance rates.
'o' ABRAHAM, supra note 80, at 38-41.
103 Typically, the standard of review for reviewing insurance commissioner
decisions is whether the finding is supported by substantial evidence. See,
e.g., Massachusetts Auto Rating and Accident Prevention Bureau v. Comm'r
of Ins., 453 N.E.2d 381, 385 (Mass. 1983); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ins.
Comm'r, 509 A.2d 719, 723-24 (Md. 1986); State Comm'r of Ins. v. North
Carolina Rate Bureau, 331 S.E.2d. 124, 131 (N.C. 1985).
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program and its mission, have been willing to assist the centers
through federal legislation. However, they dispute how much
federal money and effort should be extended to alleviate the
problem.
Three distinct legislative solutions to the community health
center insurance crisis currently occupy the attention of federal
lawmakers.' The Federally Supported Health Centers Assis-
tance Act of 1991 (H.R. 3591)05 places the financial burden of
solving the insurance crisis on the shoulders of the federal
Treasury and Justice departments by extending liability protec-
tion of the FTCA'° to center practitioners. The Ensuring
Access Through Medical Liability Reform Act of 1991 (S.
489)10' is a response by more conservative lawmakers. This
bill addresses the malpractice crisis as one component of broad
medical liability reform by advocating the formation of a nation-
wide risk retention group for the centers. The third bill, the
Community and Migrant Health Centers Self-Insurance Act of
1991 (S. 815)108 suggests a compromise by mandating a self-
insurance approach that includes features more favorable to
community health centers than S. 489.
A. H.R. 3591: THE FEDERALLY SUPPORTED HEALTH
CENTERS ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1991
The sponsors..9 of H.R. 3591 adopt the notion that the
federal government must bear responsibility for financing a
solution to the crisis facing the community health centers. The
bill shifts the duty of defending, settling, and paying malprac-
tice claims brought against community health centers from the
centers to the federal government.
... Each of the three bills analyzed is currently receiving active attention
and refinement in committee as of the date of this article. The final versions
of the bills do not yet exist.
105 H.R. 3591, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). Representative Ron Wyden
originally introduced the bill during the 101st Congress as H.R. 2239.
106 Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2671-2680 (1988).
107 S. 489, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
10 S. 815, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
'0 H.R. 3591 sponsors include Representatives Wyden (D-Or), Waxman (D-
CA), Frank (D-MA), English (D-OK), McDermott (D-WA), Rowland (D-GA),
Skelton (D-MO) and Stenholm (D-TX).
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1. Extension of FTCA Protection
H.R. 3591 shifts liability for medical malpractice from
community health centers to the U.S. Treasury by extending
.coverage of the FTCA"10 to centers, their personnel, and their
contractors. It accomplishes this by creating a fiction that the
entity and its personnel are employees of the federal govern-
ment for purposes of liability protection. Yet, the bill does not
extend to the federal government direct supervisory control over
center personnel."'
Under the bill's extension of the FTCA, plaintiffs could not
bring civil claims against community health centers or their
staff but instead would have to bring them directly against the
United States."' The FTCA would place the burden of litiga-
tion costs upon the Justice Department while the Treasury
would pay for successful claims or settlements."
2. Advantages and Disadvantages
From the perspective of the community health centers, H.R.
3591 possesses positive features. Most importantly, through the
application of FTCA liability protection, the centers would be
freed from purchasing commercial corporate and professional
malpractice insurance. Monies currently applied to commercial
110 Under the FTCA, the United States is liable for the "negligent or
wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting
within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the
United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accor-
dance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred." 28 U.S.C.
§ 1346(b) (1988).
"I H.R. 3591 states, in part,
for purposes of this section, a public or non-profit private entity
receiving Federal funds under section 329, 330, or 340, and any
officer, employee, or contractor of such an entity who is a physician or
other licensed health care practitioner shall, . . . be deemed to be an
employee of the Public Health Service.
H.R. 3591 § (2)(a) (emphasis added).
H.R. 3591 thus deems centers, their employees and contractors to be employ-
ees of the Public Health Service for purposes of FTCA protection only.
Interestingly, the bill would reinstate FTCA protection to a number of
practitioners -- former NHSC doctors -- who once enjoyed such protection. See
supra text accompanying notes 33-35.
2 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1988).
113 28 U.S.C. § 244 (1988).
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insurance would be redirected toward needed clinic services.
The NACHC and other proponents argue, therefore, that exten-
sion of FTCA liability protection redirects federal monies to
better use." 4 Second, the bill provides FTCA protection to the
centers as corporate entities,"5 a feature lacking in S. 815.
Finally, H.R. 3591 shifts the burden of litigation costs 1 6 borne
by the centers 1 to the federal government.
The Bush Administration and the Justice Department
oppose H.R. 3591,118 revealing a reluctance to bear the burden
of a shift in tort liability coverage. The Administration has
raised two related criticisms of H.R. 3591: (1) immunizing
centers from tort liability without allowing the government to
directly supervise the day-to-day activities and clinical quality
of the center personnel violates a "control principle" policy of the
FTCA," 9 and (2) H.R. 3591 would unavoidably reduce an in-
stitutional pecuniary incentive to provide high quality care.'
3. The Control Principle Debate
A central concern of the Bush Administration is that H.R.
3591 violates a fundamental precept of the FTCA - that its
protection should not apply to individuals beyond the day-to-day
supervision of the United States even if those persons operate
under federal financial support.' The FTCA is not intended
to immunize from liability those persons over whom the govern-
ment has no supervisory control. Courts refer to this principle
114 H.R. 2239 Hearings, supra note 10, at 8 (statement of Rep. Ron Wyden).
11 H.R. 3591 § 2(a).
11 Litigation costs for medical malpractice claims generally equal or exceed
40% of total indemnity costs. Study Finds Rising Defense Bills, 24 Bus. INS.
2 (1990). Indeed, approximately $1.6 to 2.4 million of the $4 to $6 million
claims paid by centers represents the costs of defending malpractice suits.
117 Centers, as insureds, do not pay defense costs directly, as insurance
companies bear the duty to defend. Yet, the cost of such defense is reflected
in premium rates.
.. H.R. 2239 Hearings, supra note 9, at 17 (statement of Stuart M. Gerson,
Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division, U.S. Dep't of Justice).
119 Id. at 22-24.
m Id. at 22.
1
1 I d. at 22-24.
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when deciding whether FTCA protection applies to persons or
entities absent clear congressional mandate.'22
The Supreme Court unanimously announced the control
principle doctrine in United States v. Orleans.'3 The Court
stated:
Federal funding reaches myriad areas of activity of local
and state governments and activities in the private
sector as well. It is inconceivable that Congress intended
to have waiver of sovereign immunity follow congressio-
nal largesse and cover countless unidentifiable classes of
"beneficiaries." The Federal Government in no sense
controls "the detailed physical performance" of all the
programs and projects it finances by gifts, grants, con-
tracts, or loans.
24
In a number of other cases, courts have found the United States
not liable for the acts or omissions of medical service contractors
because the government did not have daily control over the
contractor's activities." Thus, the Bush Administration ar-
gues that extending FTCA protection to community health
centers violates the policy underlying the control principle.
Of course, Congress is free to balance the policy behind the
control principle against countervailing arguments for providing
liability protection to non-federal employees and federal grant
recipients. Indeed, Congress has extended FTCA protection to
private individuals who perform services on behalf of the federal
government even though the government does not supervise
' Congress can, of course, statutorily extend FTCA protection by statute
to any non-federal employee by deeming such person a federal employee for
purposes of the FTCA. Where such congressional intent is not clear, however,
the control principle guides court decisions.
United States v. Orleans, 425 U.S. 807 (1976).
12 Orleans, 425 U.S. at 816 (citation omitted).
For example, in Leone v. United States, 910 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1990), the
Second Circuit considered whether private physicians, designated by the
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) as aviation medical examiners, were
employees of the government for purposes of the FTCA. The court found that
although the FAA regulations referred to the private physician-contractors as
representatives of the FAA, the federal government was under no obligation
to extend liability protection to them under the FTCA. The court stated that
while the FAA acted as a general overseer of the medical examiners, it did not
manage the details of their work or perform daily supervision. Thus, the FAA
did not maintain the type of control over the physicians required by the FTCA.
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their daily activities. Most noteworthy is 25 U.S.C. § 1680c(d)
which extends FTCA coverage to physicians who privately
contract to provide care under the Indian Health Service.12
Other examples include the extension of FTCA protection to
civilians who provide voluntary services for a museum or a
natural resources program operated by the U.S. military;
127
volunteers of the Youth Conservation Corps;128 and President-
designated science advisors of the federally administered Strate-
gic Environmental Research and Development Program. 29 In
these cases and others, Congress has deemed it important to
create the federal employee fiction for purposes of liability
protection. H.R. 3591 asserts such a rationale for the communi-
ty health center program.
The Bush Administration could reasonably argue that in
examples such as those above (except for the Indian Health
Service application), the potential of liability risk assumed by
the government does not compare to that posed by 1500 commu-
nity health center clinics and thousands of health care person-
nel. However, the NACHC counters that extending FTCA
coverage to community health centers and their personnel,
given past claims experience, represents only a minute addition
to the vast scope of FTCA coverage already provided by the
federal government.
3 0
The Bush Administration has maintained that extension of
FTCA coverage to community health centers must be accompa-
nied by greater federal supervisory control over center employ-
ees and their contractors. 13 ' H.R. 3591 proponents argue that
the bill would not threaten the quality of care concerns underly-
ing the control principle. First, federal grant management rules
already provide adequate federal supervision through clinical
'2 25 U.S.C. § 1680c(d) (1988).
1 10 U.S.C. § 1588(b) (1988).
16 U.S.C. § 1703 (1988).
12 10 U.S.C.A. § 2904 (West Supp. 1991).
13oFTCA Hearings, supra note 24, at 36 (statement of Daniel R. Hawkins,
Jr., Director of Policy Analysis, NACHC).
.1 3 H.R. 2239 Hearings, supra note 9, at 24 (statement of Stuart M. Gerson,
Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division, U.S. Dep't of Justice). The
supervisory control the Bush Administration advocates includes the ability to
make personnel decisions at individual clinics. Mr. Gerson has stated that the
federal government would "like to be able to fire over-utilizers, under-
performers and malpractitioners." Pear, supra note 8, at A18.
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guidelines and quality assurance requirements. 2 Second,
H.R. 3591 includes a quality safeguard provision which gives
DHHS adequate supervisory authority over the centers. Section
2(b)(1) of H.R. 3591 amends the Public Health Service Act as
follows:
"(h) The Secretary may not make a grant to an entity..
. unless the entity -
"(1) has implemented appropriate policies and procedures
to assure against malpractice in all health or health-
related functions performed by the entity;
"(2) has reviewed and verified the professional creden-
tials, references, claims history, fitness, professional
review organization findings, and license status of its
physicians and other licensed health care practitioners,
and, where necessary, has obtained the permission from
these individuals to gain access to this information; and
"(3) has no history of claims having been filed against it
pursuant to this section, or, if such a history exists, has
fully cooperated with the Attorney General in defending
against any such claims and either has taken, or will
take, such corrective steps to assure against such claims
in the future."
In addition, the bill authorizes the U.S. Attorney General to
remove FTCA protection"M from any center physician or other
licensed care-giver if the Attorney General finds that the person
exposes the government to an "unreasonably high degree of risk
of loss."' 5 Finally, the centers argue that H.R. 3591 merely
..2 FTCA Hearings, supra note 24, at 43 (statement of Daniel R. Hawkins,
Jr., Director of Policy Analysis, NACHC).
133 H.R. 3591, § 2(b)(1).
13 Before removing FTCA protection, the Attorney General must consult
with the Secretary of DHHS and provide notice and an opportunity for a
hearing to the physician or other medical caregiver he wishes to remove. H.R.
3591 § 2(c).
"33 Id. Factors to be used in such a determination include: (1) the subject's
claim history (must be outside the norm for a licensed practitioner), (2) the
subject's prior disciplinary history, and (3) the subject's refusal to reasonably
cooperate with the Attorney General in defending a claim. Id.
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reinstates FTCA protection to many center physicians who for
many years demonstrated satisfactory quality care while work-
ing for the NHSC.'36
The Bush Administration is reluctant to acquiesce on the
control principle debate despite these safeguards. H.R. 3591
sponsors continue to refine the bill to increase its acceptability
to the Administration. In light of the Bush Administration's
general reluctance to fashion a public solution when private or
self-help solutions might be available, the Administration may
never be satisfied with H.R. 3591.
4. Perverse Economic Incentive?
The Bush Administration also argues that H.R. 3591 elimi-
nates institutionalized pecuniary incentives for quality care.
The Administration, applying moral hazard reasoning, argues
that FTCA protection would remove direct accountability for
quality care from center caregivers and managers and thus
provide an incentive to lower standards of care and to adminis-
ter cost-saving changes in operations at the expense of quality
assurance. 3 ' This reasoning belies a cynical view of the pro-
fessionalism of center health practitioners and clinic administra-
tors. While motivations to compromise quality of care are
possible, the opportunity to achieve cost savings at the expense
of quality care is not available to centers. As stated earlier,
there are numerous quality safeguards accompanying federal
grant management rules. 138 Furthermore, H.R. 3591 comple-
16 FTCA Hearings, supra note 24, at 43 (statement of Daniel R. Hawkins,
Jr., Director of Policy Analysis, NACHC).
1 2239 Hearings, supra note 9, at 22 (statement of Stuart M. Gerson,
Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division, U.S. Dep't of Justice). Mr. Gerson
stated:
[H.R. 22391 would remove direct accountability from the providers
and from the entities for whom they work because no government
agency exercises day-to-day control over the activities of the Centers.
.... As a result, the bill fails to establish an institutional pecuniary
incentive to provide high quality care. This is particularly problemat-
ic where the Centers' patients have no real alternatives to the medical
care provided by the Centers .... [The bill] would unavoidably
reduce the incentive of the Centers to assure that quality of care
provided [sic] to their patients.
Id.
" See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
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ments federal grant provisions with its own risk management
safeguards. 139
5. Other Concerns
H.R. 3591 does, however, have weaknesses. First, it does
not authorize federal monies for defending malpractice suits
brought against the centers. The Justice Department must bear
all litigation costs in professional and corporate malpractice
claims brought against the centers and their personnel. Based
on prior experience, this amount could total $1.6 to $2.4 million
per year. 4 ' By shifting litigation duties to the Justice Depart-
ment without providing accompanying funding to cover costs,
H.R. 3591 seems to violate the budget neutral "pay-as-you-go"
principle of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990.141
Second, federal government assumption of community health
center liability risk creates a "deep pocket" which may encour-
age malpractice suits. Yet, it seems unlikely that greater
litigation will occur as a result of this shift in liability. Commu-
nity health center clients, largely indigent, are much less able
and less likely to pursue claims in the courts than persons of
middle and upper incomes.'42 In addition, while the federal
government may be a "deep pocket," it is also an imposing
litigation opponent.
Finally, litigation under the FTCA imposes limitations on
patient-claimant rights. For example, the FTCA prohibits
punitive damage awards against the government' and thus
lowers potential awards for successful claimants. In addition,
the FTCA imposes a two-year statute of limitations" which
may bar claims earlier than applicable state statutes. 45 The
139 See supra text accompanying note 133. The cynical view also ignores
other quality incentives motivating caregivers, including professional reputa-
tion, job security and personal notions of duty to the patient.
140 See supra note 116.
141 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104
Stat. 1388 (1990).
142 See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
13 28 U.S.C. § 2674.
144 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b).
14 Generally, an action for medical malpractice must be commenced within
two to four years from the time the incident giving rise to the action occurred,
or from the time the incident is discovered.
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NACHC has admitted that its advocacy for FTCA protection has
placed it in an uneasy position with respect to these claimant
rights issues.
46
Although the NACHC is concerned about H.R 3591's effect
on patients' rights, it strongly supports this initiative as the
best available solution to the crisis presently facing community
health centers.'47 H.R. 3591 offers a complete solution to the
crisis facing the community health centers. Fifty-eight million
dollars of program funding is currently applied to commercial
malpractice insurance. H.R. 3591 removes this entire burden
from the centers, thereby allowing the $58 million to be directed
toward the provision of patient services. As stated earlier, the
program could serve an additional one-half million patients each
year.'s In addition, through their focus on preventive care,
the centers could forestall more costly medical intervention."4
The transfer of liability risk from the centers to the federal
government will increase federal government costs by a mere $4
to $6 million each year (assuming past claims and litigation cost
experience of the program holds). This additional draw on the
public fisc seems a small price to pay for the benefits in en-
hanced patient services that will accrue from freeing the centers
from spiralling malpractice insurance costs.
B. S. 489: ENSURING ACCESS THROUGH MEDICAL LIABILITY
REFORM ACT OF 1991
The "Ensuring Access Through Medical Liability Reform Act
of 1991," introduced as a response to H.R. 3591,150 proposes
broad medical malpractice liability reforms. The bill: (1)
provides grants to states to improve their systems for compen-
sating individuals injured by medical malpractice, particularly
through the development of alternative dispute resolution
" 0 FTCA Hearings, supra note 24, at 36 (statement of Daniel R. Hawkins,
Jr., Policy Analysis Director, NACHC).
14 The Children's Defense Fund and the Institute of Medicine also endorse
H.R. 3591. DHHS INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT supra note 33, at 8 (1991).
' See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
149 See discussion supra part I.B.
15 Senator Orrin Hatch (R-UT) is the primary sponsor of S. 489 in the
Senate. H.R. 1004, introduced by Representative Nancy Johnson (R-CT), is
the companion bill in the House of Representatives.
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procedures;' 5 ' (2) provides grants to states and to private non-
profit organizations for research on health care procedure
outcomes and the prevention of, and compensation for, malprac-
tice-related injuries;'52 (3) establishes uniform criteria for
awarding damages in most medical malpractice actions, includ-
ing certain reductions in economic awards, 5 ' limitations on
non-economic damages,' M ceilings on attorneys fees,'1  and
imposition of a two year statute of limitations; 56 and (4) pro-
vides grants to states to establish risk management programs
and professional discipline reforms. 5 ' This article addresses
only that portion of S. 489 related to resolving the insurance
crisis facing the community health centers.
1. Community Health Centers Risk Retention Group
The provision of S. 489 addressing the malpractice insurance
cost crisis faced by community health centers proposes a self-
help strategy - the formation of an independent national risk
retention group' 5s to provide professional liability coverage. S.
489 states, in part:
"(b) Business Plan and Formation.
"(1) Development and establishment. -
'"" S. 489 § 101(a).
152 Id. § 111(a).
15 3 Id. § 201(a)(3)(A).
' 4 Id. § 201(a)(4).
'MId. § 201(a)(5)(A)-(C).
' Id. § 201(a)(6)(A).
'r' Id. § 112(a).
" Id. § 203(a). In effect, the bill circumvents federal grant management
rules barring centers from using funds to establish a risk retention pool. See
supra text accompanying notes 91-92. The provision requiring formation of a
risk retention group has been replicated in bills introduced in Congress
addressing systematic health care or medical liability reform. Health Equity
and Access Improvement Act of 1992, S. 1936, 102d Cong. 2d Sess. (1992);
Access to Health Care for All Americans Act of 1991, S. 2036, 102d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1991); American Health Quality Act, S. 1836, 102d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1991); Health Care Access and Security Act of 1991, H.R. 4054, 102d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1991); Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act of 1991, H.R. 3516,
102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); Health Access and Affordability Today Act of
1991, H.R. 3410, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
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"(A) ... the grantee shall develop a business plan...
and have established a risk retention group that meets
the requirements of... the Product Liability Risk Reten-
tion Act of 1981.
"(2) Business Plan. - The grantee shall develop a plan
for the operation of the risk retention group that shall in-
clude all actuarial reports and studies conducted with
respect to the formation, capitalization, and operation of
the group.
"(3) Structure, rights, and duties of the risk retention
group...
"(E) Participants. -
"i) In general. - Except [for good cause or other excep-
tions], all community . . . health centers that receive
assistance [under the Public Health Service Act] shall
become members in the risk retention group . . . and
shall purchase the professional liability insurance that is
offered by such group for such centers and any health
care staff or personnel employed by such centers or
under contract with such centers. All professional staff
members of such centers shall be eligible to obtain the
insurance offered by such group.159
S. 489 thus mandates program-wide development of a
business plan for a risk retention group. 160 The business plan
must provide structure to the formation, capitalization, and
continual operation of the risk retention group. The group's
administrators are required to "take all steps... necessary to
enable [the] group to be prepared to issue insurance . . ."1"
Upon creation of a risk retention group and fund, a Board of
Directors is to govern the fund through bylaws subject to the
DHHS scrutiny.'62 The Directors may administer the risk
S. 489 § 203(a).
' Id. It is unclear how community health centers throughout the United
States would coordinate efforts and resources to design a business plan, but,
presumably, this could be accomplished with the NACHC assistance.
1, Id.
" Id. The bill requires the board of directors to consist of twelve members
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retention fund themselves or contract with commercial carriers
for fund management.'" Undoubtedly, the Directors would be
allowed to negotiate with commercial reinsurance companies to
provide second-level coverage of the risk retention fund.
A risk retention group requires adequate capitalization and
reserves. S. 489 provides a one-time authorization of $1 million
to establish a risk retention pool." Any additional contribu-
tions to capitalization beyond this initial amount would be made
available only upon, and to the extent of, a showing of financial
need by independent auditors." Upon a determination by
these "experts" that the plan of operation is fiscally sound, the
DHHS may appropriate, through Congress, additional reserves.
However, this authorization extends to the Secretary only for
the first two years following fund formation.'66
The risk retention group would offer coverage to all center
personnel and contractors as well as the corporate entity it-
self."'6 Thus, the bill provides deep pocket coverage in the
event that the center is named as a defendant in a malpractice
suit. As addressed later, the language of S. 815 does not pro-
vide such corporate malpractice coverage.
2. Advantages and Disadvantages
S. 489 has been praised by the Bush Administration and
Justice Department as a pragmatic solution to the insurance
crisis facing the community health center program.1s' From
a conservative viewpoint, S. 489 is attractive because it does not
invoke large or even moderate federal appropriations - tax
dollars - to solve the insurance crisis faced by the community
health centers. Instead, it mandates centers to implement a
self-help strategy through risk retention. It expends few federal
to be appointed by the insured's representative. The DHHS Secretary would
approve the inaugural members of the board. Id.
16 Id.
16 Id.
" The auditors include "insurance, financing and business experts." Id.
16
6 Id.
67 Id. The bill states that centers "shall purchase the professional liability
insurance that is offered by such group for such centers and any staff or
personnel employed by such centers or under contract with such centers." Id.
1" H.R. 2239 Hearings, supra note 9, at 26-27 (statement of Stuart M.
Gerson, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division, U.S. Dep't of Justice).
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dollars to initiate and support the risk retention pool. Further-
more, by not guaranteeing continual congressional funding
support, S. 489 does not portend future draws upon the public
fisc.
Self-managed risk retention or self-insurance, as insuring
mechanisms, possess many advantages.'69 The NACHC was
aware of these advantages when it explored self-insurance as a
solution to the insurance crisis. First, captive risk retention
groups, by definition, are administered by the insured group.
The group can construct and operate the fund to serve its own
interests. Second, risk retention allows the insured to contain
liability risk to one known cohort. The group does not bear the
losses of other, more adversely selected, insureds. Finally, by
supplying coverage through risk retention, insureds avoid the
harsh effects of commercial insurance price setting and unstable
market forces.
170
S. 489, however, possesses more disadvantages than advan-
tages. Its fundamental flaw is that it offers no guidance for
determining the necessary size of the fund and makes no assur-
ances that capitalization contributions will be provided by the
government. Such lack of specificity and guidance raises the
specter of highly discretionary appropriations determined by
congressional and agency whim. Maintenance of capital re-
serves is paramount to the insuring function, yet S. 489 offers
no source of capitalization other than discretionary federal
funding for two years. Should capitalization appropriations
prove insufficient, it is unclear whether federal grant manage-
ment rules would then prohibit centers from using their annual
appropriations to capitalize the risk retention fund.17  It is
possible that further funding would not exist.
In addition, by ignoring any provision for reinsurance, the
bill seems to place the burden of purchasing such additional
protection for first-level coverage on the health centers them-
selves. The NACHC has determined that purchasing reinsur-
ance is cost prohibitive to the centers. 12 Moreover, commer-
19 For a comprehensive analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of
self-insurance pools, see Victor E. Schwartz & Fred S. Souk, Recent Develop-
ments in Self-Insurance: Is It Time to Stop Worrying and Love Risk Reten-
tion?, 18 FORUM 636 (1983); see also Robinson, supra note 90, at 1027-34.
"o Id. at 636.
171 DHHS INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT supra note 33, at 7.
72 See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
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cial reinsurers have expressed no interest in providing reinsur-
ance to the centers.
17 3
Furthermore, S. 489 does not explicitly guarantee that
excess capitalization (should any ever exist) would be re-directed
toward patient services. Instead, the Secretary of DHHS may
presumably utilize excess funds for any purpose. The bill would
more greatly advantage centers if it, like S. 815, explicitly
channelled excess capitalization into center operational funding.
Finally, S. 489 does not address investment of reserves. Pre-
sumably, fund managers would be allowed to invest group funds
to build reserves, but conditions for such investment are no-
where specified.
S. 489, while purporting to address the insurance crisis
facing the community health centers, seems to offer a non-
solution and little solace to the community health center pro-
gram. While the notion of assisting the centers through a self-
insurance mechanism is appealing, S. 489 offers little financial
assistance to create and maintain a risk-retention fund. Such
a fund must be adequately capitalized if it is to provide true
coverage for risk. S. 489 does not authorize adequate start-up
capitalization and it conditions future contributions to the fund
upon the determination of experts and at the discretion of
Congress and the DHHS. Indeed, S. 489 cannot guarantee that
an adequate risk retention pool will be created.
Certainly, S. 489 does not provide immediate relief to the
centers since they would have to wait for fund formation and a
determination by the government that the fund should be
capitalized. Inevitably, S. 489 places the financial burden of
solving the insurance rate crisis on the fragile budgets of the
health centers themselves.
S. 489 receives minimal to no support from the NACHC. A
recent DHHS Inspector General report reveals that Senators
Hatch and Kennedy have discussed plans to build upon S.
489.174 Senator Kennedy's involvement may significantly alter
the content of S. 489, making it more acceptable to the commu-
nity health centers.
173 See supra text accompanying note 94.
174 DHHS INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT supra note 33, at C-2 n.12.
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C. S. 815: COMMUNITY AND MIGRANT HEALTH CENTERS
SELF-INSURANCE ACT OF 1991
S. 815 appears to be a compromise between the two bills
discussed above. It was introduced by Senate Republicans 175
and has been endorsed by the Bush Administration. 17 6 S. 815
also possesses features welcomed by the NACHC. 77 Like S.
489, S. 815 mandates self-insurance through a form of risk
pooling. 78  S. 815 differs from S. 489 by specifying reserve
and capitalization requirements and creating a federal entity to
administer the self-insurance fund.
1. A Federally Administered Self-Insurance Fund
S. 815 establishes in the Treasury a self-insurance fund for
community health centers. 9 It further creates an Office of
Medical Insurance in the Public Health Service to administer
the fund.' The fund would provide coverage for liability as
follows:
"(4) Obligations from Fund.
175 Senators Brown (R-CO), Danforth (R-MO) and Hatch (R-UT).
176 The Bush Administration supports S. 815 because the bill does not
make the costs of center liability directly dependent on the public fisc and is
budget neutral. H.R. 2239 Hearings, supra note 9, at 26-27 (statement of
Stuart Gerson, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division, U.S. Dep't of
Justice).
177 Telephone Interview with Dave Cavenaugh, Policy Research Specialist,
NACHC (Feb. 23, 1992).
178 As with S. 489, S. 815, in effect, circumvents federal grant management
rules barring centers from using funds to establish a risk retention pool. See
supra text accompanying notes 91-92.
1'79 S. 815 § 2(b).
' Id. The Office of Medical Insurance will require minimal funding since
its primary function is to dispense settlement checks to successful claimants.
The DHHS Secretary's administrative budget, not Congressional appropria-
tions for the community health center program will support the Office of
Medical Insurance's operations. Telephone Interview with Paula McCann,
Legislative Aide to Sen. Hank Brown (Feb. 25, 1992). According to S. 815, the
Office of Medical Insurance may contract with "a public or non-profit private
entity for the management of claims submitted to the self-insurance fund..
S 5. 815 § 2(c).
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"(A) The Secretary [of DHHS], acting through the Office
of Medical Insurance, is authorized to obligate such sums
as are available in the self-insurance fund.., to:
"(i) Provide coverage for successful medical malpractice
claims filed against health care providers utilized by
community.., centers... or their health care providers,
if such claims arise from care provided by such providers
pursuant to authority granted by such health centers;
and
"(ii) Provide coverage for successful claims filed against
the Directors and officers of [centers] or their providers,
if such claims arise from any acts, errors, or omissions of
the duties of such Directors or officers ... 181
Therefore, the fund covers successful malpractice claims against
caregivers and tort claims brought against center directors and
officers.
The bill's language does not state that the fund would
provide coverage for corporate malpractice." 2 Approximately
15% (or $8.7 million) of the program's annual malpractice
expenditures purchase corporate, as opposed to professional,
malpractice coverage."m By not explicitly providing fund cov-
erage of corporate risk, S. 815 retains upon the centers this $8.7
million annual burden.
Under S. 815, the responsibility for litigation costs remains
with the centers."M This feature is deliberate and presumably
reflects a belief that the burden of litigation costs provides a
financial incentive to centers to maintain quality of care.
The self-insurance fund would be established through a
direct charge against the centers' appropriations. 185 Thus, the
bill would redirect monies from congressional appropriations to
I'l S. 815 § 2(b).
.82 The risk retention group proposed by S. 489, on the other hand, would
provide coverage for the corporate entity. See supra text accompanying note
167.
'a See supra text accompanying note 58.
' As mentioned earlier, of the program's annual $4 to $6 million claims
experience, the litigation costs (at about 40% of claims) are approximately $1.6
to $2.4 million per year.
'85 S. 815 § 2.
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the Treasury. S. 815 does not detail the methodology for deter-
mining each center's pro-rata contribution to the fund, but
conference report language accompanying the bill will suggest a
formula guideline."6 Each center's contribution to the trust
fund presumably would depend on factors that distinguish one
center from another. These might include the size of a center's
operating budget and staff, a center's access to non-federal
funding, and, perhaps, the prior claims experience of a center
and its personnel.
S. 815 authorizes $80 million to establish the trust fund over
three years: $30 million for the first year of operation and $25
million for each of years two and three. 8 7 After these initial
transfers, the Office of Medical Insurance can mandate addition-
al contributions if necessary to "maintain the actuarial sound-
ness of the Self-Insurance Fund.""m Thus, the bill requires
capitalization above $80 million only if the actual claims experi-
ence during the first three years of operation indicates the need
for additional protection.
The capitalization amount is expected to grow through
investments in United States-backed securities.'89 S. 815
sponsors believe the $80 million capitalization and investment
returns on that principal will be more than adequate to cover all
future claims in light of the program's past claims exper-
ience'90 and even if more catastrophic claims occur.19'
S. 815 includes other provisions designed to ensure the
financial adequacy of the self-insurance fund. The bill requires
the Office of Medical Insurance to ask the President to submit
a budget request for supplemental monies if the trust amount is
insufficient to cover a claim. 2 In addition, S. 815 requires
... An aide to Senator Brown explains that such formulas are best left to
the discretion of DHHS. Telephone Interview with Paula McCann, Legislative
Assistant to Senator Hank Brown, United States Senate (Feb. 25, 1992).
187 S. 815 § 2.
18 Id.
..9 Id. "It shall be the duty of the Secretary of the Treasury to invest such
portion of the Self-Insurance Fund as is not, in the judgment of such Secre-
tary, required to meet current withdrawals. Such investments may be made
only in interest-bearing obligations of the United States or in obligations
guaranteed as to both principal and interest by the United States." Id.
19 See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
1' Telephone Interview with Paula McCann, Legislative Assistant to
Senator Hank Brown, United States Senate (Feb. 25, 1992).
" S. 815 § 2. "If the Office of Medical Insurance determines that insuffi-
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the Office of Medical Insurance to initiate a program-wide data
collection of claims experience no later than one year after
enactment of the bill.'93 This would allow the Office to build
a comprehensive national data base portraying the community
health centers' actual claims experience. The data will assist in
an actuarial analysis of the fund which the bill requires no later
than five years from its enactment.
9 4
Finally, S. 815 provides that any moneys in the fund that
are deemed excessive will be transferred to the community
health centers for operational use. The bill states:
[I]f the Office of Medical Insurance determines that
excess monies are building up in the Self-Insurance Fund
as a result of investment returns or lower than expected
anticipated claims against the Fund, such Office shall
direct the Secretary of the Treasury to transfer such
excess from the Fund to the appropriate accounts for the
funding of [community health centers under the Public
Health Service Act]. 95
cient amounts are contained in the Self-Insurance Fund, the Office shall
request that the President submit a budget request, either as part of the
annual Budget of the United States government ... or for a supplemental
appropriation, for additional funds." Id.
193 Id.
14 Id. Three independent actuarial analyses are to be performed by the
Health Care Financing Administration, the Congressional Budget Office, and
an independent evaluator selected by the Office through a competitive bid
process. The bill states:
"[Tihe analyses ... shall be based on the claims history of the Self-
Insurance Fund for at least a 36-month period and shall contain --
"(A) recommendations on the manner in which the Fund should be
managed during the 4-year period beginning with [year five of
operation];"
"(B) a description of whether the Fund contains sufficient or exces-
sive amounts of capital; and
"(C) a description of the actions that are or may be needed to ensure
that the administration and capitalization of the Fund is in compli-




2. Advantages of S. 815
The advantages of S. 815 are most apparent when the bill is
compared to S. 489. Both bills attempt to relieve the centers'
insurance premium burden by offering a self-insurance solution.
S. 815, by authorizing $80 million for the establishment of a self-
insurance fund, extends significantly greater financial assistance
toward liability coverage. S. 489, on the other hand, provides
minimal support toward the organization of a risk retention
group. S. 489's $1 million start-up commitment leaves centers
without adequate protection and would impose upon them the
necessity to purchase costly second-level insurance. The $80
million initial contribution provided by S. 815 is also guaran-
teed, not conditioned upon later findings by independent
auditors or congressional and agency whim.
In addition, S. 815, unlike S. 489, offers some protection to
the fiscal and actuarial integrity of the self-insurance fund.
While the supplemental appropriations and actuarial analysis
provisions of S. 815 may be less than vigorous protections, they
are nevertheless offered in the spirit of fund maintenance not
found in the language of S. 489. S. 815 is also more advanta-
geous than S. 489 because it creates an independent governmen-
tal agency to administer the self-insurance fund. This demon-
strates a congressional commitment to engage the Administra-
tion and DHHS in a meaningful and active partnership in
resolving the insurance rate crisis. S. 489, on the other hand,
places all responsibility for fund administration on the centers.
S. 815 further differs demonstrably from S. 489 in its treatment
of excess reserves. Whereas S. 489 does not provide that excess
reserves must be channelled back into community health center
operations, S. 815 makes this requirement explicit.
While both S. 489 and S. 815 purport to emancipate the
centers from the purchase of costly commercial insurance, only
S. 815 can practicably accomplish this. S. 489 does not offer
timely coverage and is vague on how such protection will be
financed. S. 815, on the other hand, offers tangible protection
almost immediately. By so doing, it infuses the program with
more federal dollars for clinic operations than are currently
available. S. 815 allows centers to discontinue the annual
purchase of approximately $49.3 million of commercial profes-
sional malpractice coverage.'96 Of this $49.3 million savings,
19 Eighty-five percent (or $49.3 million) of the total $58 million premiums
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$30 million must be transferred to the Treasury, under S. 815,
for the first year capitalization of the self-insurance fund. This
leaves $19.3 million - not currently available to the centers - to
be expended on direct patient services as consistent with the
program's mission.
197
A similar benefit would accrue to the centers during years
two and three of the trust fund's capitalization. After the fund
has reached its $80 million capitalization goal, no more funds
need be diverted from community health center appropriations
to the Treasury unless the actuarial soundness of the fund is
threatened.
3. Disadvantages of S. 815
While the financial consequences of S. 815 are promising for
the future of the community health centers' mission, the bill is
clearly less advantageous to the centers than H.R. 3591.
First, while the set-away feature of S. 815 is only designed
to re-channel appropriations for only the first three years of the
self-insurance fund, it nevertheless creates a precedent that, in
times of federal budget cuts, would make any federal grant
recipient uneasy. Certainly, the set-aways allow a solution that
is financially more advantageous than the purchase of commer-
cial insurance. Once a portion of grant money is removed from
direct control of the recipients, however, such control may be
difficult to regain in the future.
Second, whereas H.R. 3591 extends corporate liability
coverage to the centers, the S. 815 self-insurance fund does not
extend such coverage. Under S. 815, the burden of purchasing
corporate malpractice insurance rests with the centers. Third,
S. 815, unlike H.R. 3591, places the burden of litigation costs
(approximately $1.6 to $2.4 million annually) on the shoulders
of the community health centers. H.R. 3591, by invoking FTCA
liability protection, redirects litigation costs to the Department
of Justice.
While S. 815 offers a practical and beneficial solution to the
insurance cost crisis faced by the centers, it clearly does not offer
purchases professional malpractice coverage. See supra text accompanying
note 58.
197 As noted earlier, since S. 815 relieves centers from the costs of defending
malpractice claims, a portion of the $19.3 million windfall (approximately $1.6
to $2.4 million) would be expended on litigation costs.
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a comprehensive solution. For this reason, S. 815 falls short of
H.R. 3591.
H.R. 3591 does offer a complete solution. It removes all
financial implications of malpractice liability risk from the
centers. The $58 million currently spent on malpractice
premiums would be re-directed toward patient services. The
cost of H.R. 3591 to the federal government is merely the cost
that would be incurred to defend, settle and pay out malpractice
claims. The $4 to $6 million additional draw on the public fisc
would allow the community health centers to serve an additional
one half million patients each year.' 8 Given the community
health center program's demonstrated ability to provide cost
effective care and, through early prevention, avoid more costly
health services in the future, this additional $4 to $6 million
investment of federal moneys is a bargain.
The Bush Administration has embraced the community
health center program's goals through its call for an additional
$90 million of federal support. 9 Investing a few more million
dollars in federal liability protection would bolster the mission
of this valuable program.
CONCLUSION
The future viability of the federal-private community health
center program is in jeopardy due to rising malpractice insur-
ance premiums. The health centers and the federal government
are searching for solutions that will preserve and, perhaps,
enhance the delivery of basic health care services to millions of
medically underserved and needy persons. Congressional
initiatives offer some promise of solving the present crisis.
S. 489 offers the least relief to community health centers. Its
vagueness and lack of adequate financial support betray a level
of commitment to the centers that pales in comparison to the
other legislative initiatives. S. 815 offers meaningful relief to
the community health centers. Yet, while it mitigates the
burden of much of the commercial insurance costs, thereby
releasing money for use on patient care, it requires centers to
finance their own solution. S. 815 would be more advantageous
to the program if it financed the cost of defending claims and
provided coverage for corporate malpractice.
See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
' See supra text accompanying note 54.
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H.R. 3591 provides the most generous support to the centers.
It allows health centers to direct $58 million currently spent on
commercial insurance to better use - the provision of services to
the needy populations for whom the program was created. H.R.
3591 recognizes that the federal government is a vital partner
of the community health center program and must bear
additional responsibility for protecting the program's important
mission.
John T. Hammarlundt
t M.H.A., Candidate for J.D., 1993. I am grateful to John R. O'Brien for the
inspiration of this article, Dr. H. Richard Beresford for guidance on an earlier
version of this article, and the editorial and research team of the Cornell
Journal of Law and Public Policy for their assistance and patience. The
opinions expressed, and any mistaken assumptions involved, are, of course, my
own.
